A Federal Court full bench has today cautioned against a narrow interpretation of the Fair Work Act's general protections provisions, as it threw out former corporate director Kate Shea's challenge to a ruling that cleared EnergyAustralia of adverse action against her.

Shea claimed the company made her redundant in February 2012 because she complained about its investigation of her sexual harassment allegations against its chief financial officer, arising from an incident in a bar after a corporate dinner in Hong Kong in February 2010.

She argued that her complaints amounted to "workplace rights" under s341 of the Fair Work Act.

But Justice Julie Anne Dodds-Streeton dismissed her claim in March, finding that the complaints were either not made in the terms alleged or were not made in good faith, and in any event were not the reasons for her retrenchment.

Justice Dodds-Streeton said the company had discharged its onus under s361 to show it was not motivated by Shea's complaints, particularly through the evidence of managing director Richard McIndoe.

Justice Chris Jessup later ordered Shea to pay some of EnergyAustralia's costs after finding that she had made unreasonable sexual misconduct allegations against McIndoe (see Related Article).

Shea challenged both the adverse action and the costs judgments, but Justices Stephen Rares, Geoffrey Flick and Jayne Jagot found neither ruling wrong.

The appeal bench said she had failed to show that Justice Dodds-Streeton made a mistake in finding that none of her alleged complaints were "a substantial and operative factor" in the company's decision to retrench her, which effectively disposed of her appeal.

But it took issue with the judge's view that a complaint needed to be "genuine" to attract the workplace right protection.

The bench said that "considerable care" needed to be exercised before implying a constraint on an employee's rights under s341.

"To too readily imply into the language of ss340 and 341 the necessity for a complaint to be a "genuine" complaint, necessarily would be productive of argument about whether a "complaint" is bona fide and may serve to discourage those who may well have mixed motives for making a complaint," the appeal bench said.

"The expression or drafting of a "complaint" should not require the sophistication or knowledge of an experienced industrial lawyer or legal advice regarding whether it should in fact be made.

"Care should also be taken before construing the term "right" in s341 in a manner which may have more far-reaching implications for the meaning of that term when it is employed elsewhere in the Fair Work Act. When considering the construction of these provisions, there is an obvious need to balance the legitimate interests of both employees and employers in a manner consistent with the objects of the Act as a whole and the objects of Part 3-1."

The bench also criticised Shea's barrister, Charles Gunst QC, over his characterisation of the way an element of the case had been argued before Justice Dodds-Streeton.

"An appellate Court is entitled to rely upon Counsel, especially Senior Counsel, to accurately outline matters relevant to an appeal without the Full Court needing to verify those matters for itself," the appeal bench said.

Shea v EnergyAustralia Services Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 167 (8 December 2014)